The long-term impact of the Uruguay Round on developing countries will be greater than anything achieved in previous multilateral trade negotiations. This outcome will result, above all, from the higher level of involvement of these countries than in earlier rounds. This advance is in part due to the expansion of the negotiating agenda to include sectors of interest to most developing countries, notably agriculture and textiles. It is also linked to the increasing liberalization taking place in many of these countries, a trend which should help bring into their economies significant new income generated by the Round. Exactly how much they gain will partly depend, of course, on how they choose to take advantage of new opportunities presented. At the same time, the Marrakesh Agreement explicitly recognizes that positive efforts by all members are necessary to encourage and cement this integration of developing country economies into the global trading system. 516 Readers of earlier parts of this book will have already noted the many special provisions in favour of developing countries that have been incorporated into the individual agreements and decisions of the Uruguay Round. As a whole, these represent an effort by the signatories to take into account the special needs of these countries, supplementing a number of previously existing measures carried over unchanged from the GATT 1947. 517 The existence of a certain amount of flexibility, for developing countries, in some of the trading rules takes on added importance under the Marrakesh 516 WTO Agreement, Preamble, para. 2. 517 In particular, Article XVIII, Part IV and the Enabling Clause introduced in 1979. The first allows flexibility in the use of trade measures to protect infant industries and in the use of quantitative import restrictions to alleviate balance-of-payments difficulties. The second is a section covering the principles and objectives of the GATT with regards to developing countries. It encourages developed countries to improve access to their markets and states that developing countries are not expected to reciprocate trade barrier reduction commitments made by developed countries. The Enabling Clause (Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, 28 November 1979 (L/4903)) permits preferential treatment to be given to, and exchanged among, developing countries, subject to stated conditions. It also authorizes specially favourable treatment for leastdeveloped countries.
Agreement because WTO members cannot opt out of any of the wide-ranging individual agreements or decisions contained within it, with the exception of the very limited Plurilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 4. This is particularly the case of the least-developed countries 518 (LDCs) 519 which have been specifically targeted as beneficiaries of many special treatment clauses included in the Round. Most significantly, the difficult circumstances faced by these countries are recognized in the Ministerial Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries, which gives them special treatment with regard to all aspects of all the agreements and requires regular reviews of their needs. As described in Part One, this decision permits LDC members to apply only those commitments which are consistent with their development needs and individual capabilities, and it sets a framework for other countries to follow when formulating and implementing their national trade policies so that these are helpful to the LDCs.
Beyond this Ministerial Decision, specific provisions within the individual agreements allow LDCs more flexibility in implementing certain WTO rules and encourage other members to cooperate when LDC interests are involved. An effort has been made to ease, where possible, the administrative burden these countries must bear and to help them to have access to technical cooperation from other members and from the WTO Secretariat. Many special provisions are not automatic, however, and must be requested by the member concerned, whether it be an LDC or another developing country. In some cases, reviews of special treatment given are also required (although often simplified for LDCs) in order to encourage the gradual integration of all developing countries into the regular WTO legal framework.
The following pages provide an overview of the contents of all the new special provisions made in the agreements, Legal Instruments and Ministerial Decisions that were part of the Uruguay Round package and which refer specifically to developing countries. The sequence follows the one used in the main part of this book.
While the contents of certain provisions may seem to repeat what has been said in others, it should be remembered that each was written in the context of an individual agreement or decision. The Ministerial Decision on LDCs is listed first, and reproduced almost in full, as it affects the whole Marrakesh Agreement. The relevant provisions contained in other areas of the complete 518 As mentioned in an earlier chapter, member countries are officially classed as least-developed according to the United Nations classification system. This is unlike the term developing country which has thus far been a subject of self-classification as far as international trade rules are concerned. 519 In the WTO, as in many other international organisations, the abbreviation LDC is used for a least-developed country, and not for developing countries as a whole.
agreement are then summarized and arranged in the same overall order as is followed in this book. Within each section, the special measures have also been grouped under four headings which reflect their general nature:
1 those recognizing the interests of least-developed/developing countries in a general manner; 2 those easing the rules or number of obligations to be met; 3 those providing longer time-frames for the implementation of certain obligations; 4 those providing for technical assistance. In addition, for easier identification, a vertical line in the right-hand margin (as at right here) marks provisions that include specific reference to LDCs.
The exact wording used in the following pages is not necessarily that of legal texts, as this chapter is meant to summarize the provisions in a more reader-friendly manner. For all questions of legal significance, please refer to the actual texts as reproduced in The Results of the Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiation: The Legal Texts. 
Synopsis of Provisions of the Uruguay Round Concerning Developing

Technical assistance
· The WTO Secretariat will draw the attention of developing country members to any notification relating to products of particular interest to them. [Article 10.6] · For certain matters, members are obliged to provide advice and/or technical assistance to other countries, especially the developing country members (upon request by the country and on mutually agreed terms), with priority going to LDCs. This includes assistance for: preparing technical regulations; establishing national standardizing bodies and participating in international ones; the methods by which the advising countrys technical regulations can best be met; establishing bodies which can assess a products conformity with standards and technical regulations; identifying steps that developing country producers should take in order to access conformity assessment systems within the territory of the importing member; and establishing institutions and legal frameworks to fulfil the obligations of participation in international and regional conformity assessment systems. Members will also encourage organizations within their own territories to advise other countries, especially the developing country members on the establishment of conformity-assessment bodies, as well as the institutions and legal frameworks required for those bodies to participate in international or regional systems. [Article 11] · The terms and conditions of any technical assistance given according to the above (Article 11) will be determined in light of the stage of development of the member, particularly in the case of LDCs. In order to avoid the creation of unnecessary obstacles to the expansion and diversification of developing country exports, members will also give assistance with regards to the application of technical regulations, standard and conformityassessment procedures within the requesting countries. .7] · Subsidies that are normally presumed to cause serious prejudice to the interests of other members will not be presumed to do so in the case of developing country members. These subsidies include: total ad valorem subsidization of a product which exceeds 5%; subsidies to cover losses sustained by an industry or, with certain exceptions, by an enterprise; and direct forgiveness of debt and grants to cover debt repayment. If a complaint of serious prejudice caused by such subsidies is brought against a developing country, the burden of proof of serious prejudice is shifted to the complaining member. [Article 27.8] · Actionable subsidies maintained by developing country members (except those referred to above) are only actionable multilaterally if they cause injury to an industry in the complainants market, or if they nullify or impair another members benefits under the GATT 1994, by displacing or impeding that members imports of like products into the developing countrys market. [Article 27.9] A countervail investigation on an export from a developing country member must be terminated if: the volume of subsidized imports from that member is negligible, i.e. less than 4% of the total imports of like products into the importers market, unless collectively, the total share of all developing country members having less than a 4% import accounts for more than 9% of the complainants imports of that product. [Article 27.10] · This agreement also requires the termination of countervail investigations against developing country members if the level of subsidization is no more than 2% of the per unit value of the product, as opposed to the 1% allowed for developed country members. For Annex VII countries (i.e. LDCs and listed developing countries), the de minimis level is set at 3%. It is also 3% for those developing countries that eliminate their export subsidies before the end of the eight-year transition period (see below).
[Article 27.10 and 27.11] · The Committee on Subsidies will, upon request by a developing country member, review the consistency of another members countervailing measure with special and differential treatment provisions of Articles 27.10 and 27.11. [Article 27.15] · The direct forgiveness of debt and certain other subsidies are not actionable under multilateral rules when such subsidies are granted within, and directly linked to, a privatization programme of a developing country member. Any programme of this kind (and the subsidies involved) must, however, be notified to the Committee, must be in place only for a limited period of time, and must result in the eventual privatization of the enterprise concerned. [Article 27.13]
Longer time-frame for implementation
· Developing country members not included in Annex VII of this agreement are allowed to phase out their export subsidies over a period of eight years, as long as these are consistent with their development needs; during this period such members must not increase the level of their export subsidies, however. Annex VII countries are exempt from the prohibition on export subsidies. [See above, Article 27.2(a)] Upon request from an interested member, the committee will determine whether or not a specific export subsidy practice of a developing country conforms with its development needs [Article 27.14]. The phasing-out period for developing country export subsidies may be extended year by year if necessary and agreed to by the committee. If an extension is not granted, however, then export subsidies must be phased out within two years. In practice, this means that any developing country applying for an extension before the original eight years are up will automatically gain two more years exemption, even if the application is turned down. [Article 27.2(b) and 27.4] · The prohibition on local content subsidies does not apply to developing country members for a period of five years after entry into force of the Marrakesh Agreement, nor to LDC members for a period of eight years.
[See above, Article 27.3] · Developing country members other than Annex VII countries that attain export competitiveness for particular products have two years to phase out export subsidies on these items. Competitiveness exists if a developing countrys exports of a product reach 3.25% of world trade in that product, for two consecutive years. Annex VII country members (i.e. LDCs and listed developing countries have a period of eight years in which to phase out export subsidies on products for which they have attained export competitiveness. [Article 27.5 and 27.6]
Agreement on Safeguards
Application of safeguard measures to imports originating in developing country members · Imports originating in a developing country member are exempt from safeguard measures if: (a) those imports share of the importing members imports of the product concerned does not exceed 3%; and (b) total imports from those developing country members having less than a 3% individual import share do not account collectively for more than 9% of the total imports of that product. [Article 9.1]
Application of safeguard measures by developing country members
· Developing country members, as all members, may apply safeguard measures for a maximum initial period of four years. Developing country members may then extend these measures for a maximum additional period of six years, rather than the four-year extension period allowed for developed country members. [Article 9.2] · Generally, safeguard measures imposed since the entry into force of the WTO and lasting more than 180 days cannot be reimposed until after a period of time equal to the original duration of the safeguard with a minimum allowable non-application period of two years. For developing country members, however, reimposition is allowed after the lapse of a period equal to half the time that the original measure was in place, although the two-year minimum still applies. (For example, a measure in place for five years in a developing country may be reimposed after two and a half years.) [Article 9.2] Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994 (Customs Valuation), and related decision 2. Fewer obligations or easing of rules · Developing countries may make a reservation permitting them to refuse a request from an importer to reverse the order of the fourth and fifth methods of valuation listed in the agreement (the deductive and computed value methods, respectively). [Annex III:3] · Developing countries may also reserve the right to value imported goods on the unit price at which the imported goods have been resold in the country of import, after undergoing further processing. This method of valuation may be applied whether or not the importer requests it (whereas developed country members can do this only upon request of the importer). [Annex III:4] 3. Longer time-frame for implementation · A five-year grace period for the application of the provisions of this agreement is allowed for developing countries that have accepted the Marrakesh Agreement and which were not signatories to the Tokyo Round agreement. An extension of this transitional period may also be requested but is subject to approval by the committee. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and related decisions and annexes
Recognition of general interests
· The members believe that the establishment of a multilateral framework for trade in services will promote the expansion of developing country exports by strengthening their domestic services capacity. Still, given the asymmetries in the degree of development of services regulations in different member countries, it is recognized that developing country members need to regulate the supply of services in their territories in order to meet national policy objectives.
[Preamble] · The serious difficulties faced by the service sectors of LDCs are recognized and should be taken into account in view of their special economic situation and their development, trade and financial needs.
[Preamble] · Members will negotiate specific commitments to facilitate the increasing participation of developing countries in world trade in services. Priority is to be given to LDCs, even if these countries have serious difficulties accepting specific commitments of their own. Negotiations will relate to: the strengthening of the domestic services industries of developing country members through, among other things, access to technology on a commercial basis; the improvement of their access to distribution channels and information networks; and the liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them (such as labour intensive services). Further, guidelines on the modalities for the special treatment of 
